Department of Philosophy, McGill University, Montreal
Death of the Author or Death of the Artist?
Zoë Poole
Zoë Poole
Barthes’ theory develops from a distinction between the author the person and the author the subject. He writes: “linguistically, the author is never more than the instance writing, just as I is never more than the instance saying I”.3 While the personal author is the person who wrote the text, the authorial subject of language is the voice situated in the particular instance of writing, and therefore impersonal. However, it is the subject of language, not the personal author, which enunciates in writing. Hence language itself performs the actual act of enunciation. As Barthes writes: “the subject of language is empty outside of the enunciation which defines it”.4 Being language, the ‘author’ the subject does not exist prior to a text but comes into existence simultaneously with it and only exists in the act of enunciation.5
Barthes links writing to the linguistic concept of a performative, a verbal form in which enunciation is empty of any content other than the act by which it is uttered, such as the phrase I declare.6 Writing is like a performative in that it is an enunciation by a subject that does not exist outside of it, positing words with “no other origin than language itself” since language itself enunciates.7 Moreover, language “ceaselessly calls into question all origins” since words are only explainable through other words.8 Since words are posited by language itself with meaning that is intrinsically linguistic, viz. of words, the meaning of a text can have no origin other than within its language. Hence the meaning of literature must be within the work itself, independent of the author’s identity and intention.
On first glance, it appears that Barthes’ theory is explicitly unique to literature and will not hold for other mediums of art. This is because it derives from a claim about how writing works linguistically: specifically, the claim that words and their meanings have no origin except language itself. From this claim it follows that the meaning posited by language is empty outside of language itself, and hence that the meaning of literature is contained within the language of the text. In its current form, Barthes’ theory cannot apply to other mediums of art: art is not necessarily linguistic, at least not in the traditional verbal sense. For example, classical music is often word-less. If a theory needs to apply to all mediums of art homogeneously to be a theory of the interpretation of art, then his theory as it is is insufficient.
I propose that if the concept of language is loosened to something that is not purely linguistic, then Barthes’ theory could apply to other mediums of art. We typically equate language with linguistics, or to be more precise, spoken or written words. However, there are non word-based languages common to our everyday experience: for example, body language. Unlike verbal language, body language does not use pre-determined signs to represent a specific meaning. Nevertheless, both types of language are used to communicate or express meaning. Hence I propose to define language not linguistically or by essence, but by its function. While language happens to function linguistically in the case of literature, it is not essentially linguistic: anything can be a language insofar as it fulfills the same role that language does in speech or writing. This role I shall define after looking at Barthes’ theory more closely.
Recall: Barthes’ theory develops from the claim that words posit and possess meaning that is empty outside of the act of enunciation, a claim which construes language linguistically. This is primarily a functional claim: it is of what words do, viz. how they posit meaning empty outside of the act of enunciation, not of what they are, viz. an arrangement of letters or sounds. Thus it is the function of words which Barthes’ theory is actually built on. I propose to define language loosely by this function. Specifically, I propose to define language as that which fulfills the role of positing meaning where this meaning is contained within the act of positing itself. On this view, anything which acts as language has meaning only within itself: all meaningful gestures, actions, words, etc. are performatives.
If there is something which functions as a language for other mediums of art, then Barthes’ theory of interpretation can be applied and the artist’s intentions and identity deemed irrelevant to interpretation of a work. There are two conditions to consider: (i) whether there can exist something constituting language in other forms of art, and (ii) whether this thing is a language as defined. In answer to (i), just as words form language for literature it can be said that sounds (including properties of pitch, length, instrument, etc) form a language for music; visuals (including properties of colour, space, texture, etc) form a language for visual art; movements (including properties of speed, duration, body parts, etc) form a language for dance; and so on. I see no reason why these ‘languages’ should not plausibly be taken to exist for any medium of art.
Condition (ii) is more complex. It requires that the constituents of a language––sounds, visuals, movements, and so on–– act like performatives in that they posit meaning that exists only within the act itself. It seems plausible that music functions this way with sound. Music enunciates sound, and the meaning of sound originates in the music itself: a sound can only be defined relative to other sounds, and any verbal expression of its meaning is a translation of a meaning that must exist in the sound prior to such expression. Moreover, sounds take on different meanings within different songs: for example, the same three consecutive notes on a piano can mean different things depending on whether they constitute a build-up versus a fall in a particular song. Hence the meaning of music can be considered to be within the sounds of that particular music itself.
Dance can be conceived of in similar fashion. While a dancer might choose a movement to convey a particular meaning, the actual meaning it conveys does not exist independent and prior to the act. Rather, the meaning of the act presupposes the existence of the act itself: the dancer cannot convey an intended meaning through a specific movement unless the movement itself exists. Being dependent on the act’s existence, the meaning conveyed by the movement depends both on its particulars, such as its speed or duration, and its situation, such as what movements precede or follow it. In this sense movement, like music or literature, is intransitive: instead of being a sign for some particular feature, its meaning belongs to the movement itself. I see no reason why the same argument cannot apply to visuals or any other constituent of language.
Conditions (i) and (ii) satisfied, it can now be said that while Barthes’ theory is explicitly unique to literature in that it derives from a linguistic claim, a modification of his theory that defines language functionally using Barthes’ own notion of words escapes the linguistic constraint and thus allows his theory in its skeletal form to apply to other mediums of art. The constituents of an artwork– be it words, sound, visuals, movements, etc– exist for the purpose of communication a meaning that is essentially contained in the act, and therefore within the art itself. In this sense art is not a vehicle for communicating an external meaning but a meaning itself.
2. Ibid., 372.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., 373.